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Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
conflict is substantial enough to question the validity of admission of
other-sex-crimes evidence involving either the prosecuting witness or
third persons.
CONCLUSION
In a criminal prosecution, a defendant with a criminal record is
not afforded the same degree of impartiality as a defendant who has
none. It is a rare case where the prosecution is unable to introduce
criminal history evidence. In spite of this inequality, courts are prone to
admit criminal history evidence on the theory that it serves some "addi-
tional purpose," be it to impeach credibility, rebut good character, or aid
in proving guilt. But when criminal history evidence serves only to
expose a defendant's propensity to commit crime, it is no longer a question
of balancing "additional purpose" against possible prejudice. Rather, the
question is whether the defendant will be found guilty, not on the whole
of the evidence, but on the jury's overmastering hostility roused by evi-
dence of his criminal character. The latter situation exists under the
present liberal use of criminal history evidence in Ohio.
EDWARD F. MALREK
The Near-Absolute Rights of the Holder of an Ohio
Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title
The Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act' has been widely
recognized2 as extreme - extreme in its protection of the local bona fide
purchaser of a motor vehicle. As the Ohio act is applied today, the holder
of a dear Ohio certificate of title has little to fear, for his ownership rights
are nearly absolute.
The recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Pottmeyer,3 again focuses attention on Ohio's strict position. As the
result of this case, a thief who procures a dear Ohio certificate can pass
good title to a bona fide purchaser. This holding motivates a review and
analysis of Ohio's position and the effect of the certificate on ownership
and security interests in Ohio motor vehicles.
1. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4505.01-.99.
2. 'The Ohio law ... is an example of the most stringent certificate act . Note, 36
MNN. L REV. 77, 80 (1951). "Ohio's Certificate of Title Act is an example of the most
stringent type." Note, 5 W. REs. L. REv. 403, 404 (1954). "Ohio just about takes the cake."
Oldfather, The Tale of Title Certificates in Kansas, 3 KAN. L. RE v. 305, 317 (1955).
3. 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
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BACKGROUND
A motor vehicle is a uniquely mobile chattel. Frequent changes in
ownership over large areas subject motor vehicle transactions to special
problems. Although a local county recording system may be adequate
for protection of interests in relatively stationary chattels, it is manifestly
incapable of protecting ownership and security interests in a chattel of
constantly changing situs. The onerous task of searching for a lien in
every county and large city in the state prohibits a thorough search.'
Prompted by this need for special legislation in the area of motor vehicle
transactions, forty-one legislatures have now enacted motor vehicle cer-
tificate of title acts.'
Certificate of title statutes typically provide that every motor vehicle
owned locally be represented by a certificate of title.' The state normally
maintains duplicate copies in a central filing system. Transfer of title is
accomplished by an assignment of the certificate to the transferee. But
many certificate of title acts require more than issuance of certificates and
establishment of a central filing system. Often, security interests may
only be perfected by notation on the certificate itself.7 A certificate of
tide in these jurisdictions serves as a portable recording system.
The expressed purpose of certificate of title legislation is to protect
ownership of vehicles against fraud and theft.' Ideally, a prospective
purchaser should be able to ascertain the status of a vehicle's title by the
simple inspection of one document. Practice, however, is far removed
from the ideal. A major contributor is the lack of uniformity of the var-
ious state acts.
THE STATUTES
Legal literature is replete with articles dissecting, analyzing, classify-
ing and comparing the various and varied title acts.' No attempt is made
here to amplify or enlarge upon past studies. Appreciation of Ohio's posi-
4. Finance companies often do not consider it worthwhile to record their liens in states with
no title act. Note, 36 MINN. L. REV. 77, 82 & n.42 (1951).
5. See notes 15 and 16 infra.
6. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.03; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-.16 (Supp. 1964).
7. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-6-7 to -22 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27
(Supp. 1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-110 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.13 (Supp. 1963).
8. "The purpose of the act is ... to make automobile titles more safe and certain, to protect
those who deal therein, 'and to obviate the necessity of relying upon circumstantial evidence
as to the ownership thereof."' Jorgensen v. Morris, 122 Colo. 94, 98, 220 P.2d 348, 361
(1950). "[Ihe purpose of the Ohio Certificate of Title Act is to protect owners of auto-
mobiles against fraud." Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Fin. Co., 88 Ohio App. 205,
210, 98 N.E.2d 848, 851 (1950).
9. E.g., Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197
(1951); Comment, The California Used Car Dealer and the Foreign Lien - A Study in the
Conflict of Laws, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 543 (1959); Note, The Effect of Motor Vehicle Registra-
tion Statutes on Security Transactions and Recordations, 1951 WASH. U.LQ. 539.
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don can only be gained, however, by viewing its statute in the context of
other such acts. A short exposition and overview is therefore necessary.
Non-Title States
Ten states'" do not have certificate of tide legislation. Instead,
registration laws'1 provide for the registration of all vehicles for revenue
production and law enforcement purposes. The issued registration cer-
tificate or receipt, although not intended to control tide, serves some of
the purposes of a certificate of tide. 2 But holders of security interests in
motor vehicles must seek protection from local recording systems"
created under chattel mortgage acts, conditional sales acts, or the Uni-
form Commercial Code. 4
Title States
The forty-one tide-act jurisdictions have been conveniently classified
according to the degree which their legislatures have undertaken to vest
the certificate of tide with conclusiveness of ownership. A minority of
states'5 provide for notation of security interests on the certificate only
upon transfer of the vehicle. These title acts are referred to as "incom-
plete." Encumbrances created between conveyances can only be protected
by local recording. Consequently, the tide certificate utilized by "incom-
plete" tide acts is of little more value than a registration receipt.
A majority of tide-act jurisdictions' provide that all liens and encum-
brances on motor vehicles be noted on the certificate of tide.'7 However,
some contain no express provision concerning the effect of the notation
10. Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, Virginia. See Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 574-75 (1959).
11. See, e.g., KY. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 186.005-.285 (1963).
12. See Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 197,
198-99 (1951).
13. But cf. GA. ACrs 1925, at 315 (liens noted on application for registration certificate).
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-401 provides a filing system for perfecting security
interests in all chattels.
15. Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
West Virginia, Wisconsin. See Comment, 47 CALIF. L. Rnv. 543, 576-86 (1959).
16. See Comment, supra note 15. Since the California Law Review compilation, the follow-
ing have enacted a title act: CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-165 to -195 (1960); GA. CODE
ANN. §5 68-401a to -443a.
17. A number of acts do not expressly designate the statutory procedure as exclusive. Judicial
decision has rectified the situation in most jurisdictions by declaring the ordinary chattel mort-
gage recording procedure superseded by the title act. In Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox City, 174
S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1943), the mortgagee filed his mortgage in full compliance with the
chattel mortgage act but failed to have the lien noted on the certificate of title. Held: there
was no constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser.
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on third party claims."8 Also, the effect of this type of statute depends
heavily on judicial interpretation.
A stricter variety of title statutes demands notation of all security in-
terests as a prerequisite to constructive notice.' 0 The Ohio statute falls
within this category.
The Ohio Statute
The Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act became effective
January 1, 1938. Its constitutionality was upheld that same year. 0 The
sweeping language of section 4505.04 of the Ohio Revised Code, neces-
sary to any discussion of the Ohio Law, reads in part:
No court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title,
claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle sold or dis-
posed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced: (a) By a cer-
tificate of title or a manufacturer's or importer's certificate....21
Obviously, a literal construction of this language can have a signifi-
cant impact on established rules of law. However, such a strict an inter-
pretation has never been applied consistently in all cases involving the
Ohio motor vehicle law. The areas of fraud22 and theft2 '3 adequately
demonstrate the past inconsistencies in the courts' application of the
statute.
FRAUD IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE
Opportunities for forgery and fraud are present in any situation in
which the law clothes a document with great value. In the case of title
certificates, the defrauder can obtain a clear certificate by various means.
The "duplicates racket" is an example. The owner of a motor vehicle
may procure a duplicate certificate by claiming loss or destruction of the
original. The "racket" consists of encumbering the vehicle with the du-
plicate, and subsequently conveying the vehicle by assignment of the dear
original certificate.24
Another means of securing a certificate involves interstate movement.
Suppose that an encumbered vehicle is transported to another state and
falsely represented as unencumbered. In non-title states it is not difficult
18. Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wyoming.
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27(2) (1957); Mo. REV. STAT. § 301.210 (1959)
(lien is notice "to whole world"); OHIO REV. CODE 4505.04.
20. State ex rel. City Loan & Say. Co. v. Taggart, 134 Ohio St. 374, 17 N.E.2d 758 (1938).
21. OHIo REV. CODE § 4505.04.
22. Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 547, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
23. Atlantic Fin. Co. v. Fisher, 173 Ohio St. 387, 183 N.E.2d 135 (1962).
24. For a recent illustration of shady dealing including the "duplicates racket" see City Loan
& Sav. Co. v. Ludwig, 197 N.E.2d 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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to obtain a registration certificate. In fact, in several of these states a
certificate may be obtained without producing evidence of ownership2
Subsequent presentation of the registration certificate in a title state re-
sults in the issuance of a title certificate.
Typically, a replevin action is brought by a foreign lienor against a
local purchaser who relied on the clear certificate of title. The great
majority of courts rely upon whether the foreign lienor consented to the
removal of the vehicle from the lien-creating state.26 If the foreign lienor
has knowledge of the removal, or has not taken all precautions to protect
his interests, the majority of states allows the local purchaser to prevail,
usually on the ground that he is the more innocent of two innocent
parties.2
However, where the foreign lienor has taken all protective measures,
and has no notice of the removal until after the subsequent conveyance, a
"harder" case is presented. Equally innocent parties are now before the
court. The policy of encouraging credit operations works in favor of the
lien holder. On the other hand, holding for the innocent purchaser en-
hances the value of the certificate as a notice-giving instrument, and thus
encourages the free alienability of motor vehicles. The great weight of
American authority" allows the foreign lienor to prevail, usually on prin-
ciples of comity."
Ohio Decisions
An Ohio appeals court?' bravely followed the majority American view
in spite of the literal words of the Ohio statute. In holding for the foreign
lienor, the court declared a fraudulently procured Ohio certificate of title
void ab initio. A contrary decision, declared the court, would have the
effect of overriding the very purpose of the statute, that is, the protection
of ownership of motor vehicles from fraud." Several other appellate
courts, however, read the statute literally and held for the local pur-
chaser.32
25. Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 548 & n.45 (1959).
26. This conforms to the Restatement rule. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws §§ 265-78
(1934).
27. Nichols v. Bogda Motors, Inc., 118 Ind. App. 156, 77 N.E.2d 905 (1948).
28. First Nat'l Bank v. Swegler, 336 IMI. App. 197, 82 N.E.2d 920 (1948) (chattel mortgage);
Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209 S.W.2d 846 (1948) (conditional sales
contract); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1312, 1326-29 (1950).
29. Atha v. Bockius, 39 Cal. 2d 635, 248 P.2d 745 (1952); Livingston v. National Shaw-
mut Bank, 62 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1952); Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d
843 (1950).
30. Associates Discount Corp. v. Colonial Fin. Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98 N.E.2d 848
(1950).
31. Id. at 210, 98 N.B.2d at 851.
32. White-Allen Chevrolet Co. v. Licher, 81 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948); Schiefer v.
Schnaufer, 71 Ohio App. 431, 50 N.E.2d 365 (1943); Union Commercial Corp. v. Schmunk,
30 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (Ct. App. 1939).
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The conflict was resolved in 1951 in the much discussed,33 landmark
decision of Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler.34 There, a California vendee trans-
ported an encumbered automobile to Vermont, a non-title state, and
fraudulently obtained a registration certificate indicating unencumbered
ownership. On the strength of the Vermont certificate, the vendee re-
ceived a clean Ohio certificate and then conveyed the automobile to an
innocent Ohio purchaser. The supreme court held that the California
vendor could not succeed in a replevin action against a subsequent, good
faith Ohio purchaser possessing a clean Ohio certificate of title. Plain-
tiff's comity argument was rejected on the ground that the statute clearly
stated the public policy of the state. 5 No right, title, claim, or interest
would be recognized by the court unless accompanied by an Ohio certifi-
cate of title.
The broad holding in Kelley Kar has been approved by some, criti-
cized by others, 6 but generally followed by the appellate courts.3 7 At
least one appellate court,"8 however, in considering a conversion action,
showed dissatisfaction with the Kelley Kar decision:
It seems strange that by the law of the [Kelley Karl ... case a certifi-
cate of title induced by fraud and perjury is given absolute verity and
permitted to destroy the lien of a valid mortgage made in a sister
state. ... 39
The court then confined the Kelley Kar holding to instances where the
contract of sale to the local purchaser was made in Ohio. This position
has been criticized.4"
In the most recent appellate decision,41 a Kentucky mortgagor ob-
tained a clear Ohio certificate by presenting a Kentucky registration
and a false application."' Controlled by the Kelley Kar decision, the
case presents no new law. The facts, however, illustrate the ease with
33. Note, 5 W. REs. L REv. 403, 406 (1954); Note, 6 ARm L. REv. 223 (1951); Note, 27
NOTRE DAME LAW. 139 (1951); Note, 13 OHio ST. L.J. 296 (1952).
34. 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951).
35. Id. at 548, 99 N.E.2d at 669.
36. Note, 5 W. RES. L. Ray. 403, 408 (1954); Note, 16 Omo ST. LJ. 625, 628-29 (1956).
37. Fayette Inv. Corp. v. Jack Johnson Chevrolet Co., 119 Ohio App. 111, 197 N.E.2d 373
(1963). Commercial Credit Corp. v. Reising, 96 Ohio App. 445, 122 N.E.2d 301 (1953),
appeal dismissed, 161 Ohio St. 570, 120 N.E.2d 307 (1954); Royal Ind. Bank v. Klein, 92
Ohio App. 309, 110 N.E.2d 40 (1952); Graves & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper & Son Motor Sales,
Inc., 119 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
38. Associates Discount Corp. v. Main Street Motors, Inc., 113 N.E.2d 734 (Ohio Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 488, 105 N.E.2d 878 (1952).
39. Id. at 738.
40. Note, 5 W. REs. L. RaV. 403, 407 (1954).
41. Fayette Inv. Corp. v. Jack Johnson Chevrolet Co., 119 Ohio App. 111, 197 N.E.2d 373
(1963).
42. See Omno REv. CODE § 4505.02 for a statement of the clerk's duties.
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which a party from a bordering non-title state, such as Kentucky, can ob-
tain a clean Ohio certificate and thus defeat a foreign security interest.
THEFT IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE
It is a general rule of American law that one cannot convey better
tide to personal property than he has.43  However, exceptions and quali-
fications have been engrafted on the general rule due to its harsh effect
on innocent purchasers. For example, principles of estoppel may pre-
clude an original owner from recovery.44 Money and negotiable paper
transferable by delivery are well established exceptions.45 Further, in
some cases a bona fide purchaser of warehouse receipts or bills of lading
is protected.4" But motor vehicle transactions, whether the vehicle is
accompanied by a certificate of title or not, have never been considered an
exception to the general rule that a thief cannot pass title.
In the typical case involving theft, the foreign plaintiff brings a re-
plevin action against the local purchaser. With the exception of possible
estoppel,47 no issue is presented in the non-title state.4" Under common
law plaintiff prevails. In title-act states, however, the defendant bona
fide purchaser may contend that the act modifies the common law.
In a replevin action in Nebraska, a title-act state, defendant argued
that his Nebraska certificate of title was conclusive of his ownership and
right to possession.4" The argument was premised on a provision" in
the Nebraska statute which exactly duplicates the "no court . . . shall
recognize the right, title, claim or interest . . . ." language in section
4505.04 of the Ohio Revised Code. The court held for the plaintiff,
apparently on the ground that the legislature "under the guise of a police
regulation" cannot validly invade the field of contract and property
rights.5 '
A Texas court,5 faced with a similar fact situation, found for the
plaintiff by applying two sections of the Texas act. One section makes
43. Murray v. Lardner, 69 U.S. 110, 118 (1864); 46 AM. JuR. Sales § 458 (1943).
44. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403; OHIO REV. CODE § 1302.44.
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-201, -202; UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW 5 1-10.
46. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-502; OHIO REv. CODE § 1307.30.
47. See Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., v. Harrison Motor Co., 151 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Ct. App.
1963), wherein a bona fide purchaser failed to prevail on the estoppel defense.
48. Stathem v. Ferrell, 267 Ala. 333, 101 So. 2d 546 (1958) (dictum); Gay v. Huguley,
33 Ala. App. 483, 34 So. 2d 712 (1948); McElroy v. Williams Bros. Motors, Inc., 104 Ga.
App. 435, 121 S.E.2d 917 (1961); Gurley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 233 Miss. 58, 101 So. 2d 101
(1958).
49. Snyder v. Lincoln, 150 Neb. 581, 588-89, 35 N.W.2d 483, 488 (1948).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-105 (Supp. 1957).
51. Snyder v. Lincoln, 150 Neb. 581, 590, 35 N.W.2d 483, 488 (1948).
52. Beauchamp v. Nichols, 278 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
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it unlawful to apply for a certificate on a stolen vehicle. The other pro-
vides that all sales in violation of the act are void. Result: the bona fide
purchaser never received title.5"
Ohio Decisions
Prior to 1964, the Ohio courts54 had unanimously regarded the case
involving theft as a clear exception to the "plain meaning" construction
of section 4505.04 of the Ohio Revised Code as applied in other cases.
The leading appellate decision, Mock v. Kaffits,55 held that the provisions
of the act did not prevent application of the rule that stolen property may
be recovered from an innocent purchaser.56
The same issue reached the Ohio Supreme Court in 1962 in the case
of Atlantic Finance Co. v. Fisher." There a thief, having stolen an auto-
mobile in Illinois, procured a clear Ohio certificate of title and conveyed
the auto to defendant. Plaintiff, a foreign lienor in possession of an 1i-
linois certificate of title, brought a replevin action. According to the
majority:
[T] he public policy of Ohio of protecting innocent Ohio purchasers as ex-
pressed in the case of Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler ... should weigh no more
heavily in the scales than the protection of innocent citizens of our sister
states from theft.58
The court tipped those scales in favor of the out-of-state interest on the
ground that full faith and credit must be given an Illinois certificate of
title.
The holding in the Atlantic Finance case remained the law in Ohio
for two years. In Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer,59 the supreme
court expressly overruled Atlantic Finance.6" The majority found that
the dear words of the act, as previously construed in Kelley Kar, required
judgment for the bona fide purchaser. As an added argument, the court
pointed to the legislative action taken in the session following the Kelley
53. Id. at 538.
54. Atlantic Fin. Co. v. Fisher, 173 Ohio St. 387, 183 N.E.2d 135 (1962); Ohio Gas. Ins.
Co. v. Guterman, 97 Ohio App. 237, 125 N.E.2d 350 (1954); Mock v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio
App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
55. 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
56. In a subsequent appellate decision the Kelley Kar holding was distinguished. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Guterman, 97 Ohio App. 237, 125 N.E.2d 350 (1954).
57. 173 Ohio St. 387, 183 N.E.2d 135 (1962).
58. Id. at 390, 183 N.E.2d at 137.
59. 176 Ohio St. 1, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
60. Although the opinion does not make it clear, no outright theft was involved. The West
Virginia dealer voluntarily relinquished possession of the vehicle to the buyer after execution
of a conditional sales contract. A cohort of the buyer then transported the automobile to
Ohio and placed it on the auction block.
The facts of the case did not demand the overruling of Atlantic Finance; they appear to be
controlled by Kelley Kar.
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Kar decision. Section 4505.04 was amended in that session to include
an additional means of evidencing a "right, title, claim or interest" in a
motor vehicle, namely, "by admission in the pleadings or stipulation of
the parties."'" By making this change and no other, the majority rea-
soned that the legislature had affirmatively approved the Kelley Kar hold-
ing. For the court to now hold otherwise "would obviously amount to
a usurpation of legislative power.... .
The Pottmeyer minority conceded that section 4505.04, standing
alone, appears to make the Ohio certificate conclusive as to tide and se-
curity interests. But the dissent contended that section 4504.04 must
be read in context; other sections indicate that the innocent holder of a
certificate is not protected in all cases. For instance, the Registrar of
Motor Vehicles is given the power to cancel certificates issued on stolen
vehicles."3
Moreover, the minority argued that the legislative purpose of the act,
as stated in its title, is "to prevent the importation of stolen motor vehicles
and thefts and frauds in the transfer of title to motor vehicles .
this purpose is thwarted by allowing a thief to pass title.
It is significant that the minority opinion in the Pottmeyer decision
makes no reference to the action of the legislature. The attempted "read-
ing into the statute" of a legislative intent contrary to the majority hold-
ing appears quite weak in light of the amendment enacted after the Kelley
Kar decision.
Although not mentioned by the minority, one might argue that the
Kelley Kar holding applies only to cases of fraud, and not to situations
involving theft. But as noted by Chief Justice Taft speaking for the
majority:
[T] here is nothing in the certificate of Tide Act to justify the condusion
that the General Assembly intended to protect a bona fide purchaser of
an automobile where his Ohio certificate resulted from the fraudulent
representations of a swindler, but not where that certificate resulted from
such representations by a thief.65
This reasoning is valid. Conceding the legislative stamp of approval on
Kelley Kar, consistency and congruity in the application of the law can
only lead to the conclusion that a thief can pass good tide to a motor
vehicle in Ohio.
61. OHio Rv. CODE § 4505.04 (B).
62. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 1, 5, 197 N.E.2d 343, 346 (1964).
63. OHio R v. CoDE §§ 4505.02-.13.
64. 117 Ohio Laws 373 (1937).
65. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio State 1, 9, 197 N.E.2d 343, 349
(1964).
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REMAINING INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLICATION OF
THE OHIO ACT
Riley v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.
The strong and clear language of the Pottmeyer decision might easily
lead one to expect uniformity in future interpretations and applications
of the Ohio act. But a case decided the same day as Pottmeyer, frustrates
these expectations.
In Riley v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co.,6" the court was faced with the in-
terpretation of the term "theft" as employed in an insurance policy. A
Texas chattel mortgagee, having been victimized by his mortgagor, re-
possessed the encumbered automobile from a Zanesville, Ohio street. The
Ohio bona fide purchaser, holder of an Ohio certificate of tide, demanded
payment from his insurer. The present action resulted from the insurer's
refusal.
Noting that one is not chargeable with theft if he takes another's
property with the belief that it is his own, a majority of the court, con-
sisting of the three Pottmeyer dissenters plus Judge O'Neil, held for the
defendant-insurer. According to the court, repossession of an automobile
by a party claiming under a valid and recorded foreign lien is not a "theft"
as that term is used in an insurance contract.
The inconsistency of this decision with the prior interpretations of
the Ohio Motor Vehicle Act is plain. The Ohio certificate holder's tide
and interest may not be defeated in an Ohio court. Yet that same tide
and interest is subject to defeasance on the street. In effect, the court
has instructed and encouraged foreign interests to resort to self-help.
In an able dissent, Judge Gibson summarizes the effect of the majority
decision:
To hold that there was no theft where the . . . [foreign lienor] through
self-help repossessed the automobile in Ohio under a subsisting and re-
corded Texas mortgage lien thereon is (1) to recognize the claim or
interest of a person in or to a motor vehicle who does not hold an Ohio
certificate of title, and (2) to construe the insurance contract liberally
in favor of the insurer, all contrary to well established Ohio law. 67
Floor-Plan Estoppel Exception
There still remains at least one area in which the Ohio title act has
not been given a literal interpretation. This is the area of wholesale
financing plans and the floor-plan estoppel doctrine.
In purchasing automobiles from manufacturers, dealers often finance
the purchase through finance companies. The debt is secured by a chat-
66. 176 Ohio St. 16, 197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
67. Riley v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 16, 22, 197 N.E.2d 362, 367 (1964).
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tel mortgage on the automobile." In Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Em-
ployees Union Local No. 1099,69 the dealer sold the mortgaged automo-
biles to parties who had no notice of the prior liens. Upon default of
payment by the dealer, the finance company brought a replevin action
against the purchasers.
Under the dear language of the title law, estoppel cannot operate in
favor of a bona fide purchaser against a party holding a manufacturer's
certificate of tide."0 Nevertheless, the appellate court nullified the lien
on equitable grounds." As between two innocent parties, the first to
trust the wrongdoer and provide the means for committing fraud must
bear the loss.
Similarly, in Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil,72 the same appellate court
again avoided the title act, this time on an agency theory. 3 When a
dealer sells vehicles subject to a floor-plan mortgage, he is in effect acting
as an agent for the finance company. Consequently, in Kozoil the fi-
nance company was directed to present a certificate of title to the innocent
purchaser. The Ohio Supreme Court sustained the decision in a per cur-
iam opinion.7'
It is significant that the majority in Pottmeyer cited the Kozoil de-
cision with approval. The strong language of Pottmeyer might otherwise
have cast some doubt on the future validity of floor-plan cases. The
court cited Kozoil as illustrative of the protection available to the bona
fide purchaser, even without a certificate of title.
CONCLUSION
Concededly, stringent protection of the local purchaser is parochial
in character. But a mere label does not aid analysis. More importantly,
a strict and unbending rule necessarily results in unfairness in some cases.
For instance, in a contest between a local commercial buyer who does not
bother to check his seller's tide, and an out-of-state party who has taken
all possible protective precautions, should not, on principles of fairness,
68. 9 Onto JUR- 2d Chattel Mortgages S 112 (1954).
69. 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960).
70. The applicable section reads in part: "Any mortgage... covering a motor vehicle, if
such instrument is accompanied by delivery of a manufacturer's . . .certificate and followed
by actual and continued possession of such certificate by the holder of said instrument ...
shall be valid... against subsequent purchasers...." OHIO REv. CODE § 4505.13.
71. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local No. 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341,
350, 165 N.E.2d 435, 441 (1960).
72. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, 111 Ohio App. 501, 165 N.E.2d 444 (1960); 22 OHIO ST.
LJ. 746 (1961).
73. The agency theory had been pressed by defendant in the first Mutaal Finance case, but
was rejected by the court. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local No. 1099,
110 Ohio App. 341, 353, 165 N.E.2d 435, 443 (1960).
74. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Kozoil, 172 Ohio St. 265, 175 N.E.2d 88 (1961).
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the out-of-state interest prevail? Also, in the case of outright theft, is it
not difficult to reconcile the loss suffered by the foreign owner?
In the case of a noncommercial local purchaser, however, it is diffi-
cult to find unfairness in Ohio's position. Although a local purchaser
realizes the risk of mechanical defects in purchasing a used car, he does
not apprehend loss of his title. On the other hand, the foreign creditor
is in the business of assuming risks. If his debtor is shiftless, he ought
to bear the loss.
The result of a strict act, strictly applied, is a tide certificate of en-
hanced value. Reliance may be placed on the certificate itself. Conse-
quently, the alienability of motor vehicles is encouraged. In effect, Ohio
has decided this policy overbalances the harshness that may result in the
individual case. Furthermore, it is the non-uniformity of state law which
is at the root of a majority of the interstate problems, not the Ohio act.
At least one constructive suggestion deserves attention. Having given
motor vehicle certificates of tide such high value, Ohio should strengthen
its issuance procedure. Specifically, upon receipt of an application for
a certificate for an out-of-state vehicle, the clerk should be required to
obtain from the officials of the foreign state a statement of the title
status.
75
The present Ohio law requires only that such an applicant "present
a certificate of title, bill of sale, or other evidence of ownership required
by the law of another state from which such motor vehicle was
brought....76 Prior to the issuance of the certificate, the clerk of courts
is required to exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining whether or
not the facts of the application are true.
It is submitted that more stringent requirements in the case of an
application for an out-of-state vehicle would decrease the number of suc-
cessful frauds. Local interests would not be harmed, except for a short
delay in some cases, and foreign interests would receive greater protection.
Of course, a more rigid administrative procedure is only a partial solu-
tion. But in view of Ohio's strict protection of its own citizens, it is only
just that steps be taken to assure other citizens some measure of protection.
ROLF H. SCHEIDEL
75. For a proposed statute incorporating this provision see Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law
and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 455, 481 (1948).
76. OHIo REV. CODE § 4505.06.
77. Ibid.
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